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THE PRESENT STATUS AND THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF AVIATION LAW*
GEORGE B. LOGANt
Aviation law is developing apparently in three directions, which
is one more direction than the ordinary development of law in our
country. Ordinarily law is developed by a growing body of judi-
cial decisions which we call the common law of that subject; then,
sometimes contemporaneously with, but usually following, we have
the statutory law which either changes or makes more definite and
certain the common law. In aviation we have these two develop-
ments but have also a third due to the peculiar nature of aviation,
and that is the development of law by regulation. This develop-
ment, of course, has its foundation in statutory enactment, but the
statutory enactment is only the foundation and not the body of
the law.
When aviation first loomed on the legal horizon as a substan-
tial industry, and when it first became apparent that the industry
would probably develop a body of law all its own, or cause some
change or clarification in existing common law, several problems
were suggested. Among these problems was the question of the
ownership of air space, or the right of flight; the liability of the
aviator for trespass voluntary and involuntary; jurisdiction over
air space, first as an international problem and second as a state
problem within the United States; the question of nuisance by
flight; the possibility of tall buildings, smoke stacks, and power
wires being regairded as nuisances to flying; the extent of the
jurisdiction of the federal government over aviation as interstate
commerce; the effect of aviation on existing personal insurance;
the situs and status of marriages, contracts, wills and other con-
tractual relations entered into in an indeterminate space in the air.
These and many other legal conundrums were offered by way
of papers, pamphlets, and addresses, and, at the time of offering
very few, if any, suggested positive solutions. To only a few of
these can I give any time because on only a few has there been
any development by way of common law.
*Address delivered at the American Bar Association Convention, at
Atlantic City, September 18, 1931.
tChairman, American Bar Association Committee on Aeronautical Law.
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Out of these there is first the question of sovereignty over
air space. This is distinct and different from ownership. Prior
to the World War there were three well established schools
of thought. There were those who advocated that the air space
was an ocean and that aviators of all nations should be privileged
to use it over the soil of any other nation without let or hindrance
as on the high seas. This was called the Freedom of Flight theory.
There were those who insisted that the subjacent nations had the
right to regulate the air space and restrict its use up to the height
that it was possible to regulate it, similar to the three mile zone
or the twelve mile zone on the high seas, and that above that the
air space was free from regulation. The exact height of this
regulated air below was a matter of controversy that ranged every-
where from 500 feet, the height of useful occupancy of man, to
five miles, the range of anti-aircraft guns. This was called the
Zone theory. The third school of thought urged that each nation
had the right to restrict the use of all air space above it to the
same extent that they had the right to restrict the occupancy of
their own soil. This was called the Absolute Sovereignty theory.
This question has been settled, not by common law, or by de-
velopment of international law acceptances but by the war itself,
which closed the frontiers of all .warring nations to the planes of
its enemies. At the time of the Treaty of Versailles, there was
also an air convention' the preamble of which was "The High
Contracting Parties recognize that every Power has complete and
exclusive sovereignty over the air space above its territory." The
United States signed this treaty but it failed of ratification with the
Versailles Treaty. The United States has since, however, entered
into a similar treaty with the American countries in the Pan-
American Convention but prior to that in the Air Commerce Act
of 1926, Congress declared as follows: "The government of the
United States has to the exclusion of all foreign nations complete
sovereignty of the air space over the lands and waters of the United
States, including the Canal Zone." This question then may be
regarded as definitely settled.
In line with it, it would seem that each state would similarly
have jurisdiction or sovereignty in all the air space above its own
territory except in so far as an assertion of jurisdiction would con-
flict with the federal government in interstate commerce. Indeed,
the Uniform State Law of Aeronautics prepared by the Aero-
1. Air Convention of 1919.
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nautical Law Committee of this Association some years ago and
which was adopted by thirteen states, carries the declaration that
"Sovereignty in the'space above the lands and waters of this State
is declared to rest in the State." There seems to be no quarrel
with this pronouncement and based upon its truth it must follow
the states have with respect to air space the same powers they
have with respect to the surface. It would also seem to follow
that the venue of crimes committed in air space would seem to
be in the state and county below but the difficulty of proving this
venue is obvious.
It remains then, on this question of air space, to discuss owner-
ship. This is a subject which cannot be covered under four hours,
and that would be one side of the argument only; but on this
subject we hope to have some authoritative common law very soon.
Already three theories have been evolved in the discussions which
I have seen. One is the theory that the land owner owns ab-
solutely all of the air space above his land to an unlimited height-
the "cujus solum est" theory in its absolue form; the other that
the land owner owns the air space to the height of useful occupancy
depending on the development of engineering skill and science in
the erection of edifices. The final one is that the land owner does
not own the air space, but does have, as growing out of his land
ownership, the exclusive sole and conveyable right to take pos-
session of the air space to any height he sees fit. It would follow
that the flight of an airplane through the air space above his land
is not and never can be a trespass; but may under the circumstances,
taking into consideration the height of buildings, the use to which
the land is put, and the manner of the flight, become a nuisance
and be enjoined as such. Each case under this latter theory nec-
essarily depends upon its own facts, as does any other nuisance.
To this latter theory your present committee is unanimously
wedded.
There have been two cases having to do with this particular
problem. In the case of Smith v. New England Aircraft Coin-
pany,2 decided by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, it was
held that flights at 500 feet and more did not constitute trespass;
that flights at 100 feet and less did constitute trespass. In Swet-
land v. Curtis' in the District Court of Ohio, sitting at Toledo,
it was held that flights at 500 feet and more did not constitute
trespass, and flights of less than 500 feet did. The necessary im-
2. 170 N. E. 385 (Mass., 1930).
3. 41 F. (2d) 929 (Ohio, 1930).
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plication from these holdings as to trespass would indicate that
the courts felt that the land owners did own the air space up to
the height mentioned, although as a matter of fact the air space
was not occupied to that height at that time. The 500 foot level
mentioned in these decisions was the height specified for flight
over uncongested areas by the Department of Commerce in defin-
ing the navigable air space and the courts held that such a regula-
tion by the Secretary of Commerce under the authority of the Air
Commerce Act of 1926 was a permissible interference with the
rights of private ownership. It will be observed from these two
statements that these courts evidently believe in the theory of air
ownership, but from the reading of the opinions it is clearly seen
that the courts were in both cases very doubtful as to the extent
of air ownership if any, and as to its nature if it existed, both
courts stating that air ownership was bound to be different from
the ownership of land and chattels.
The Massachusetts decision was the decision of a court of
last resort and no attempt has been made to carry it farther. The
Ohio decision has been appealed by both parties and aviation inter-
ests have asked leave to file briefs, and a distinguished member of
this committee, Mrs. Mabel Walker Willebrandt, as amicus curiae
on behalf of the American Airways has prepared such a brief.
I wish to take this occasion to recommend the reading of this
brief as the clearest discussion of the history, import, scope and
authority, of the maxim "cujus solum est" which has been written
since aviation law discussion began.
The American LawInstitute in its Restatement of the Law
of Torts had before it the question of trespass on land, and had
apparently followed in its first suggested text the inferences aris-
ing out of the two cases which I have mentioned, and in its first
draft indicated that a flight through air space at less than 500
feet constituted a trespass. To this statement your committee
took exception at the meeting of the American Law Institute in
Washington, D. C., last year, and as a result have been invited
to confer with the committee preparing this text prior to its re-
submission.
It is not my desire to start a discussion on this floor, on this
topic, but your committee believes that its theory, namely, that
there is no ownership of unenclosed air space but there is the sole
and exclusive right in the owner to enclose the air space and that
nuisance may be committed by flight not only above the land but
near to the occupier of the land, gives to the land owner all of
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the right or title that he needs to fully use and improve whatever
land is owned by him. At the same time it makes possible the
development of aviation by denying to litigiously inclined persons
a cause of action based on the mere technicality of a harmless
flight through air space.
There have been so far only two cases which have even re-
ferred to the question of the scope of the power of the federal
government to regulate flight in air space as between it and the
several states. The Air Commerce Act of 1926 gave to the Sec-
retary of Commerce the right to regulate interstate commercial
flying, but also gave him the right to establish flying rules and
regulations, called air traffic rules, relating to all flying interstate,
intrastate and non-commercial. Some doubt has been thrown on
the power of the federal government to promulgate these flying
rules, first as to their entirety, and second as to the propriety of
some of the individual rules thus promulgated.
In Neiswonger v. Goodyear,4 in passing on a demurrer, the
federal court suggested that it was a little difficult to see how the
500 feet minimum altitude rule was necessary to protect interstate
commerce. In other words, if interstate commerce had to be kept
above 500 feet, and intrastate commerce went below it, the inter-
ference was doubtful. This intimation indicated that the court
felt that the government did have the right to enact and enforce
all air traffic rules which were necessary for the protection of
interstate commerce but might not have the right to enact or en-
force rules which were unnecessary for this purpose. If this is
the correct interpretation of the court's intimation then it would
follow that whether or not a given air traffic rule is valid would
be a question for judicial determination.
This matter was again referred to in People v. Katz5 a crim-
inal prosecution arising out of the violation of state air traffic
rules. The point was made that the state government had no right
to issue air traffic rules, this field of intrastate commerce having
been appropriated by Congress under the necessity of preventing
a burden upon interstate commerce. The trial court in New York
rejected this plea. One may only surmise as to the grounds. It
may have been because the court thought that the federal govern-
ment had not appropriated the field; or that, having appropriated
the field, state laws not inconsistent were still valid; or that the
4. 35 F. (2d) 761 (1929).
5. 140 Misc. 46, 249 N. Y. S. 719 (1931).
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federal government regulations could not lawfully apply to intra-
state commerce.
Your committee, of course, feels that different air traffic rules
in the different states would be as great a calamity to aviation
as were the conflicting state regulations to the railroads. There is
at present no indication that the states will promulgate air traffic
rules which differ in any material way from those of the federal
government, but commercial aviation being wholly unconscious, as it
must be, of state lines, ought to have one set of its flying rules
only.
One matter on which there has been some development by
way of common law is the matter of the effect of aviation on life
and accident insurance. Some years ago in preparing a short text
on this subject, I examined some hundred odd life insurance poli-
cies. In none of them was there any provision avoiding the pay-
ment of loss for deaths resulting from aviation. A good many
of these policies, however, had provisions providing for double in-
demnity in the event of an accidental death, and this double in-
demnity provision was limited by proviso against deaths resulting
from aviation. In general these provisos used two different verbs
"engaging" in aviation, "participating" in aviation. It will readily
be seen that the question would immediately arise as to what was
meant by "engaging" and "participating." It should be added also
that some policies use the word "aviation" and some policies the
word "aeronautics."
Allied with the use of these verbs and nouns, and for the
same purpose were the usual accident policies, but the accident
policies added another complication in providing for double in-
demnities in the case of accidental death while a passenger on a
common carrier, but excluding deaths resulting from participating
or engaging in aviation or aeronautics.
Unfortunately the holdings on these cases have not been as
consistent as one would desire in attempting to explain what is
the law. In Gits v. Life Insurance Company,' a passenger in a
sight-seeing plane was held to be not "engaged" in aeronautical op-
erations. The word operations in that policy evidently was of
persuasive force. In Masonic Accident Company v. Jackson7 a
passenger was held to be not "engaged" in aviation. In Benefit
Association v. Hayden,8 the Supreme Court of Arkansas held that
a passenger was not "engaged" in aeronautics.
6. 32 F. (2d) 7 (1929).
7. 164 N. E. 628 (1929).
8. 299 S. W. 995 (1927).
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In Peters v. Prudential Insurance Company,' the court held
that a passenger in an airplane was not "engaged in aviation or
submarine operations." The court gave a good deal of attention
to the punctuation and indicated that if there had been a comma
after "aviation," the court might have held that the passenger was
engaged in "aviation," though not in "aviation operations." Three
of these cases were decided in 1929 and one in 1927. Prior to
that, in 1921, the Supreme Court of Florida had held in Travellers
Insurance Company v. Peake'° that a passenger was "participating
in aeronautics"; the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Bew v.
Travellers," had held that a passenger was "participating in areo-
nautics." . It will be seen that the later cases favored a more liberal
construction and the reason would seem to be that aviation is com-
ing to be regarded not as a sport and an advanture but as an in-
dustry and passenger carrying as a matter of common occurrence.
This is particularly illustrated by a later decision of the Supreme
Court of Florida in Price v. Prudential,2 where the Court had
before it the same clause as involved in the Peters case and held
that a passenger was not "engaged" in aviation operations. The
Court distinguished in this case between its earlier holding in the
Peake case by reason of the fact that the Peake case used the word
"participating" and the Price case the word "engaged."
As a result of these decisions we find that the insurance com-
panies are changing the language of their exclusions clauses both
in accident policies and in the double indemnity provision of life
policies. We also find, purely as a matter of interest, that the
life insurance companies do not wholly forbid flying in issuing
their ordinary policies, but have prepared clauses which recite that
the face of the policy will be paid even though the death of the
passenger was the result of riding as a fare-paying passenger in a
licensed airplane, operated by a licensed pilot, by an incorporated
passenger carrier operated between definitely established airports.
While life insurance companies are still very reluctant to accept
the airplane pilot or the individual who pilots his own plane, a
passenger on established air lines is now accepted practically with-
out discrimination.
Referring back to the matter of double indemnity in accident
policies in the case of death while on a common carrier but ex-
9. 233 N. Y. S. 500 (1929).
10. 89 S. 418 (1921).
11. 112 A. 859 (1921).
12. 124 S. 817 (1929).
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cluding all claims resulting from death while participating in aero-
nautics, those courts which hold that the passenger participates are
going to find themselves impaled on the horns of a dilemma if they
should also hold that an air passenger plane is a "common carrier."
The question as to whether or not an air passenger carrier is a
common carrier has not been directly litigated with respect to any
of our established air lines. But in the case of Brown v. Pacific
Mutual,'3 and North American Accident Co. v. Pitts,1 4 this matter
of the inconsistencies between the clause giving double indemnity
in case of a death on a common carrier and the clause excluding
indemnity for death while participating in aeronautics, was directly
raised. The air carrier in these two cases however was simply a
sightseeing operator who took short trips whenever sufficient pas-
sengers were available and whenever the weather suited and both
courts held that such an air carrier was not a common carrier.
No court has yet been called upon to pass upon the air carrier
which advertised to the public at large, accepts all passengers offer-
ing themselves, and maintains fixed schedules between established
termini.
Another field in which we may look for interesting litigation
is in the matter of general aviation insurance. Insurance is now
being written to protect the operators of aircraft against personal
liability and property damage to third persons; also to passenger.
On the planes themselves insurance is carried against fire, theft,
and "crack-up." The fire insurance policies are written to cover
the craft while on the ground and the motor not running; also
while the motor is running; also while the ship is in the air; and
also for fire following a "crack-up." Naturally these rates vary
considerably. Compensation policies are being extended to cover
pilots, co-pilots, mechanics, and couriers. All of this is a new field.
There are few policy wordings exactly alike, and no decisions so
far interpreting these new policy clauses.
Just one more matter probably of interest, and I am done with
this phase. The lawyers have had a great deal of sport speculat-
ing as to whether or not a hydroplane is an airplane or a boat and
the answer as received from the courts is that it is neither fish,
flesh, nor good red herring.
In Crawford Brothers, No. 2,11 it was held that the law of
marine salvage did not apply to aircraft, but this was a disabled
13. 8 F. (2d) 996 (1925).
14. 213 Ala. 102 (1925).
15. 215 F. 269 (1914).
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aircraft in the water. In the case of in re Reinhardt,16 it was held
that an employee engaged in repairing a hydroplane on the water
was not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act in the state but must bring his action in the federal
court. In a criminal proceeding in the case of People v. Smith, 7
it was held that a hydroplane was a motor boat within the mean-
ing of the criminal statute regulating the use of mufflers; while the
Treasury Department has held in its rulings that hydroplanes and
sea planes must be registered as vessels. In the case of Wendorff
v. Missouri State Life Insurance Company,' a case arising under
an accident policy the point was made that the death of the policy
holder riding in a hydroplane was not caused by the fall of the
hydroplane; in other words not by reason of participation in aero-
nautics, but because of the sinking of the plane an hour or so after
it landed. The point was further made that a hydroplane after
landing was a vessel and not an aeronautical device. The court
overruled the contention holding that the hydroplane was never a
vessel.
With reference to the statutory development of law I wish to
refer first to some of the statutory work of this association and
this I do with the greatest trepidation. The Air Law Committee
of this association worked out some years ago a law known as
"Uniform State Law of Aeronautics." This law is now in effect
in thirteen states. Two matters of common law, there being
none on the subject, were attempted to be settled by legislative
pronouncement in this law. The first was the old question of air
space rights. It was declared that the ownership of the space above
the lands and waters was vested in the several owners beneath,
subject to the right of flight as described in the following section.
The following section declared that flight in aircraft is lawful un-
less at such a low altitude as to interfere with the then existing
use. of the land or water. If it were possible to settle this matter
in this manner we would have no quarrel, but we have always felt
that even though the right of flight, that is to say, of reasonable
flight, was attempted to be created by this declaration, the very
attempt itself was frustrated by the prior declaration that owner-
ship of air space was vested in the owners of the surface. It has
always seemed that if the air space was "owned," legislative per-
mission to fly through it is at least doubtful.
16. 232 N. Y. 115 (1921).
17. 196 N. Y. S. 241 (1922).
18. 1 S. W. (2d) 99 (1927).
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This code also provided for absolute liability to be imposed
upon the owner of aircraft for all damage done to persons or prop-
erty by reason of the descent of the aircraft whether voluntary or
involuntary.
No distinction was made for those cases in which the owner
was not the operator or in which the owner has leased his plane,
loaned his plane, or in which it had been stolen. The question of
responsible agency was eliminated and the owner made absolutely
liable. The question of negligence was also eliminated as to the
owner; he was held liable for "Acts of God" and for pure acci-
dents, whereas an aeronaut who was not the owner and was the
operator was made liable only for his negligence. With all due
deference it is suggested that the present Air Law Committee is
not in sympathy with these pronouncements of statutory law and
we believe that the owner should not be liable unless there is first,
a responsible agency in the operation of the plane, and second, un-
less there is negligence in the operation or maintenance of the
plane. We have suggested in the code which we have prepared
that proof of injury should be prima facie evidence of negligence,
thus relieving the-man on the ground from the unfair burden of
establishing the efficient and negligent cause of an airplane's descent.
Mr. John C. Cooper, Jr. of Jacksonville, Florida, one of the mem-
bers of our committee, has prepared a very able monograph on this
subject of liability 19 and the reasoning and the authority presented
by him seemed to be conclusive and to fully warrant the position
taken by this committee.
In addition to the Uniform State Law of Aeronautics in thir-
teen states, there is legislation in practically every other state in
one form or another concerning aviation, but in most part these
statutes have been passed with a view of providing for the safety
of aircraft operators and passengers, and persons and property on
the ground. To this end a great many of the states have provided.
that aircraft shall not be flown unless the plane is registered and
the pilot licensed, and the qualifications for registration and licenses
in most of the cases are those qualifications which are required by
the Department of Commerce.
In some states these qualifications are required by statute; in
some a state official or commission is designated to issue licenses
under such rules and regulations as they may promulgate and these
promulgations follow the requirements of the Department of Com-
19. John C. Cooper, Aircraft Liability to Persons and Property on the
Ground, 17 Am. Bar Assn. Jour. 435 (1931).
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merce. In many cases the following of the Department of Com-
merce rules and regulations is made mandatory under the statute.
Air traffic rules similar to the federal air traffic rules have in
some states been enacted into statute law and in some states pro-
mulgated as regulations under statutory authority.
The desirability of uniformity among the several states is
nowhere more acute than it is in the matter of the regulation of
pilots, planes and air traffic rules. It is obvious though that this
desire for uniformity should not necessarily carry us to the extent
of asking that the federal government assume the whole burden,
or to the extent' of asking that the states submit to federal juris-
diction as to all types of flying. There is splendid opportunity for
cooperation. The personnel of the Department of Commerce is
not sufficient in number, although very high in quality, to police
all of the flying in the United States, and to enforce all of the
regulations with respect thereto.
You will be interested to know that so far, the cooperation be-
tween Federal and State aviation officials has been of the most
cordial nature. Cooperation between the states themselves is also
developing very satisfactorily. Perhaps the newest organization
in this country is the National Association of State Aviation Of-
ficials, formed at Cleveland. Ohio, on September 2nd, and the
chairman of your Aeronautical Law Committee feels himself hon-
ored to be the non-retained general counsel of this association.
The largest amount of law by regulation in aviation is, of
course, that body of regulation promulgated by the Secretary of
Commerce under the provisions of the Air Commerce Act of 1926.
These regulations, as probably all of you know, require registra-
tion of all planes engaged in interstate commerce, in fact, incidentally
the requirement is much broader because all pilots engaged in in-
terstate commerce must have licenses and no pilot licensed by the
federal authority may fly an unregistered plane. This requirement
has practically made it mandatory upon manufacturers to see that
all planes are registered. The requirements for registration are
lengthy and of great detail and the Department has set up elaborate
machinery not only for the original design but also for the approval
of the materials to be used and finally for the inspection and flight
tests of the completed planes. Provisions for pilots' licenses in-
clude detailed physical tests and mental tests, as well as flying
ability and hours of experience in the air.
Flying schools are in fact regulated by the federal government,
but in a peculiar way. The Department of Commerce has an-
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nounced that flying schools will be rated by them if they voluntarily
apply for such rating. There could be no requirement by law
that they do so. The competition among flying schools, however,
particularly, in their advertising, makes it practically impossible for
the non-rated school to secure pupils. Hence by practical competi-
tive conditions we find that the federal government is in fact super-
vising flying schools. Before rating is given, the equipment, teach-
ing personnel, as well as the character of the flying field used must
be approved by the Department of Commerce.
I have already referred to the matter of air traffic rules. These
are regulations issued by the Department of Commerce governing
the method of flying and these rules apply to all flying of all
planes. The constitutionality of such regulations as applied to non-
commercial flying and to intrastate commerce has never been tested
and may never be, as the uniformity of flying rules is so eminently
desirable that it is unlikely that pilots or manufacturers will ever
seriously contest the validity of these rules.
There is now developing an interesting body of law which
does not come by way of regulation nor by way of direct legisla-
tion, but is the incidental result of the gasoline tax which exists
one hundred per cent-this is to say, in every state and in the Dis-
trict of Columbia. In practically every case this tax is imposed
,(upon gasoline used upon the highways of this state" and in nearly
every case the funds collected go to the highway fund. A great
many of the states specifically exempt gasoline used in farm trac-
tors, in stationary engines, manufacturing plants, et cetera, and to
this list of exemption many states add gasoline used in aircraft.
Where such exemption is not provided for there seems to be two
vulnerable points for attack as to the constitutionality of such a
tax. In the first place, aviation gasoline is not used upon the
highways and from the language of the taxing statute it would
seem to be clearly exempt. And on the other hand, if made to
include gasoline used in aircraft it would seem to be without the
purpose of the statute, discriminatory, and hence void. There is
as yet no case, however, involving this particular point. There
have been several cases that involved the second point of attack
which is that a tax upon gasoline used in interstate commerce is
a burden upon one of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce
and hence unconstitutional.
This was the holding in the case of Helson v. Kentucky,
2
in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that gasoline
20. 279 U. S. 245 (1928).
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used in a motor to propel a ferry boat between Indiana and Ken-
tucky and was an instrumentality of commerce and could not be taxed
by the state of Kentucky. There was the same holding in Trans-
continental and Western Air v. Asplund,2' decided by a federal
district court of New Mexico. The same court went farther
in the case of Mid-continental Air v. Lujan,22 and held that where
the gasoline used in interstate commerce was commingled with and
could not be separated from that used in intrastate commerce, the
tax could not be applied to the air carrier in question. To the same
effect is the holding in United States Airways v. Shaw.23
There is one exception, however, to the rule that a tax levied
by a state may not impose a burden upon interstate commerce.
This exception is where the tax is imposed in exchange for the
use of a state-provided instrumentality. The gasoline tax has been
upheld as applied to buses engaged in interstate commerce because
of the fact that the buses use the state highways. This was the
holding in Interstate Transit Company v. Kykendall,24 in Liberty
Highway Company v. Michigan,2 as applied to gasoline taxes, and
was also the holding in Hendrick v. Maryland,2 as applied to the
automobile license tax.
Now some of the states use the gasoline license tax collected
from airplanes directly for the benefit of the aviation industry.
In Wyoming the tax collected at municipal airports is paid to the
State Treasurer and by him immediately turned back to the muni-
cipalities to be used in maintaining the airports. In view of this
fact the United States District Court for Wyoming in the case of
Boeing Air Transport v. Edelman, decided June 27, 1931, held
that the tax was valid as being a tax supported by a considera-
tion for the use of the facilities of the airports at Cheyenne and
Rock Springs.
There is a growing tendency on the part of states to devote
not only money collected from the aviation gasoline tax but
also additional public funds for the creation of state facilities
for aviation. This is now being done in Arkansas, Idaho, Michi-
gan, Tennessee, Maine, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming, and
of these states most of them appropriate more than is received from
the gasoline tax. There was in the beginning, some three years
ago, a legal and constitutional question raised that the expenditure
21. Reported in U. S. Daily, December 31, 1930, p. 8.
22. 47 F. (2d) 266 (1931).
23. 43 F. (2d) 148 (1930).
24. 284 F. 635 (1922).
25. 294 F. 703 (1923).
26. 235 U. S. 610 (1914)
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of public public funds for airports and aviation facilities was not
a public purpose and hence unauthorized and unconstitutional. This
question has been put at rest by such decisions as Dysart v. St.
Louis and Ennis v. Kansas City,27 McClintock v. Rosebur, 28 Hile
v. Cleveland,29 Hesse v. Rath,30 Lincoln v. Johnson,2 ' Doughty v.
Baltimore,12 Wichita v. Clapp,"2 and Ruth v. Oklahoma. 4  The
Aeronautical Law Committee has prepared as has been explained
a uniform Airports Act which we hope will serve to put at rest
in those states which have not had the matter before their courts
this question of the right of states and municipalities to use public
funds for the development of aviation facilities.
In conclusion may I say that there seems to be no good reason
why. the federal government and the states should not appropriate
funds for aid of aviation. The railroads owe their early existence
to federal and state land and money grants. That some of this
was unwise is not disputed, but that some of it was necessary for
the develdpment of this country is likewise not disputed. The fed-
eral government appropriates funds for the aid of navigation both
on the high seas and on our navigable rivers. The federal govern-
ment and the states appropriate large sums annually for the building
of highways, which, while not always pleasantly received by the
railroads, have been of tremendous importance in the development
of the hinterland off of the railroads.
It is probably out of place for the chairman of your Air Law
Committee to express an opinion as to public policy, but I want
to say now that all of the members of your committee are interested
in the success of aviation and would not be interested in
the subject of aviation law otherwise. We believe in the future
of aviation and we believe in the wise national policy of supporting
aviation by mail contracts, by the aviation facilities provided
through the Department of Commerce by the support of aviation
manufacturers through the Army and Navy procurement programs
and look forward hopefully to increasing support of aviation by
the several states, in cooperating not only in the enforcing of avia-
tion regulations, but in the creation and maintenance by public
funds of aviation facilities.
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